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HYPOTHESES ON mE NATIONALITIES FACTOR 
IN SOVIET RELIGIOUS POLICY 
by Pedro Ramet 
Pedro Ramet , a native of London ,  England , has lived 
a lmost half of his l ife in Europe--chief ly in England , 
Austri a ,  Germany , and Yugoslavia.  He  received his A . B .  
i n  philosophy from Stanford University , his M . A .  in 
international relations from the University of 
Arkansa s ,  and his Ph. D .  in political science , in 1 981 , 
from UCLA . He  i s  currently an Assistant Professor in 
the Henry M.  Jackson School of International S tudies ,  
Uni versity o f  Washington. He  i s  the author o f  Sadat 
and the Kremlin ( 1 980)  and Nationalism and Federali sm 
in Yugoslavia ,  1963-1983 ( 1 984 ) , and edi tor of 
Religion and Nationali sm in Soviet and East European 
Politics ( in press) . Thi s  essay wa s wri tten for a 
conference on religion in the USSR sponsored by 
Religion in Communist Dominated Areas ( RCDA) and will 
be appea ring in a forthcoming i s sue of that j ournal . 
One of the differences between the Soviet outlook and the Western, 
whi ch confronts us the moment we undertake to examine Soviet political 
behavior , i s  that whereas Westerners tend to v i ew  ' policy ' nebulously , 
v i ewing it u sually as a continuing process of establi shing fixed 
procedur e s  and expectations in a given realm , in Soviet t erms ' policy '  
i s  more o ften seen as a program designed to eradicate a problem , to 
so lve it absolut ely .  As such , the erad i cation of the problem i s  expected 
also to end the need for a pol i cy--.whi ch reveals that the Soviet 
in terpr etation of ' policy ' i s  distinctly utopian . Pol icy has no other 
raise� d ' etre than the solution of problems ,  for the Soviets , and both 
problems and policies are assigned f ixed values ,  i . e .  they are defined 
ideol ogi ca l ly .  This concept of poli cy is  underpinned by the now strictly 
honori fic doctrine of the witheri ng away of the state , which holds that 
once certain problems have been solved , there would be no further need 
fo r pol i cy  and h ence the state apparatus could disappear . In  approaching 
"pol i cy "  matters , the Soviet approach is  i to proceed from a def initi on 
of pol i cy , whi ch embraces a def inition of the problem . These defini­
tion s ,  in turn,  yi eld a set of prerequisites for the soluti on of the 
problem , and thi s set of prerequisites i tsel f implies some concept of 
the ins truments and targets of pol i cy . 
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Soviet religious pol i cy is seen as a component in the broader 
pro j ect  of eradi cating attachment to pr e-communist culture  ( in Soviet 
pa rlance , "building the N ew Soviet Man " )  and of creating a unified , 
" Soviet" culture . Pri vate views , as alternative ideologie s ,  are 
obstacles to the succes s  of this proj ect.  Within this framework, 
rel igion is seen as private prej udice �aving roots in pre-bourgeois and 
bourgeois society .
1 
Viewed in this context, the oft-touted Soviet 
guarantee that religion is the private affa ir of the individual is  seen 
to have a us eful corollary , viz . that , by virtue of being a " private" 
af fair , i t  is not public and henc e ,  religious institutions enj oy no 
publ i c  rights or prerogat ives , have no function in publ i c  life , and are 
be st restri cted to purely liturgi cal functions . 2 And , insofa r  as  this 
private af fa ir i s ,  in fac t ,  a private affliction , it becomes the right 
and duty of communi sts to take concerted measures to eradicate 
" pre-sci�ntific consciousnes s . "  O r ,  as a communi st j udge in Czechoslo­
vakia once put it , " In our socialist society all the cond { tions have 
been established so that all the citizens can get rid of their 
prejudices,  includi ng their rel igious bel iefs . " 3  
Moreover , once religion i s  defined as a "vestige" of pre-bourgeois 
and bourgoi s  society , its  el imi nation , i n  cond i tions of "the bui lding of 
comrunism , "  becomes a matter of definition , which is to say , beyond 
que sti on .  Accordingly , " under  devel oped socialism the sphere of rel igion 
is increasing ly narrowing , " 4 
" liberated " from rel igiosity . 5 
as increasing numbers of people are 
The three chief components in the Soviet understanding of religion 
identify the prerequisite factors for the elimination of religion . As a 
private af fair , it is to be dislodged from the publ ic sphere , regulated , 
r egister ed ,  and contro l led . The Soviets appreciate the organically 
political character of rel igion and the consequences of depoliticizing 
religion,  as Zachary I rwin has pointed out : "Religion becomes politics 
wh en it seeks to externalize intrinsi c obl iga tion through the fa ct  of a 
regime , and politics becomes religion in the apotheosis of a popular 
et hos .  Rel igion atrophies without re1evance to social fa cts , whether or 
not. they are independent of a regime . "6 As a prejudice ,  it is to be 
combatted by systematic atheist propaganda . As a vestige of pr�-
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bourgeois � bourgeois society , its links with national sentiment must 
be shatte red , and national identity founded on a new bas is--for the 
Soviets ,  di fference s  in languag e .  The disappearance of religion has 
t raditionally been associated with the a chievement of " full com­
mun ism"--an association whi ch would postpone the disappearance of 
religion to the i ndefinite f utur e .  Yet a recent article in Komsomolskaya 
pravda c alled for "a more determined s truggle" against rel igion , on the 
a rgument 
7 
years . " 
that " religion must disappear of itself in about twelve 
Soviet religious policy has been tactically  inconsistent (with 
periods of r e laxation a nd periods of intensified struggle) , but 
st rategically . 
8 
consJ..stent . Dif ferences across time ( e . g .  pre- and 
pos t-1 9 28 )  and across denominations a re tactical incon sistencies 
directed t oward the same ends , but reflecting contextua l differences and 
d i f ferences in opportuni ty .  The Russian Orthodox Church , for example ,  is 
fa r mo re sus ceptible to manipulation , infilt ration , and subversion than 
i s  the cathol ic Church in Li thuania ; hence , an entire range of policy 
in struments becomes available in the former case , whi ch are not 
available in the latte r .  
A s  noted before , policy i n  a specific sphere i s  seen by the Soviets 
as  but an a s pect of their larger utopian proj ect.  Hence , religious 
po licy i s  not an autonomous realm . Its  goals and values do not ari s e  
wi thin a ny autonomous framework but only within the broader context of 
" the bui lding of communi sm . " The Soviets conceive of policy as a 
seamle s s  �b, a united " front , "  so that the relation of religious policy 
to nationalities policy can only be , in Leninist terms , a mutually 
supportive one .  9 Soviet nationalities policy , whi ch defines nationality 
as the consciousness associated with a shared language,  cultur e ,  
. d . l ' f  1 0  h h od h . d ' ff te rrJ.. tory , an economJ.. c 1 e ,  a s  soug t to er e et nJ..c J.. erences 
by promoting the spread of Russian l anguage and culture , fostering 
et hnic intermarriage , assailing trad itional customs and ceremonie s ,  and · 
st imulating ( even forcibly )  interregional migration . 11 Hence , whi le 
pe rmitti ng the Moscow patriarchate to continue to publi sh Russian-
language materi al s ,  the Soviet state banned publi cation o f  the 
Ukrainian-l ang uage monthly , Pravoslavnyj visnyk in the 1 960 s , and except 
in we stern Ukraine , Rus sian is the language o f  the sermons in Orthodox 
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churches throughout Ukraine as well  as the language of Ukrainian 
ec clesiastical administration. 12 Rel igious policy , in thi s way , is 
attuned to the needs of nationalities pol i cy . 
Seen in thi s light, the disjunction of rel igion and nationalism 
as sumes critical importance not only from the standpoi nt of the atheist 
desire to weaken collective attachment to the ' folk '  rel igion , but also 
from the standpoint of the assimi latory drive to enerva te  national 
identity and to reduce it to mere differences in crafts ,  costumes ,  and 
danc e s .  soviet dissident Valentyn Moroz saw this quite clea rly when he 
wrote that 
th e most convenient way of de stroying [ the]  founda­
tions of a nation is to employ the pretext of fight ing 
aga inst the Church . The Church has grown into cultura l 
l i fe so deeply that it is imposs ible to touch it with­
out damaging the spiri tual stru cture of the nation . It  
is impossible to  imagine tradi tiona! values without 
th e Church . . .  [Hence , ] the struggle a��inst the Chur ch 
means a struggle aga i nst the culture .  
The purpose of thi s pape r is  to set forth hypotheses on the nation­
alities factor in Soviet religious pol icy and , in the proce s s ,  to relate 
religion and nati onal ism analytically,  providing the conceptual ba sis 
for empirical l inkages.  Given the number of hypotheses being outlined , 
it wi l l  not be possibl e to provide conclusive arguments , only suggestive 
ones.  'Ihe hypotheses are aggregated into three broad groups . Hypotheses 
· 1.-3 are concerned with the orientations of rel igious groups and 
national ists toward each other.  Hypotheses · 4-5 are concer·ned with 
· processes associated with modernization in the Sov i et Union . Hypotheses 
6-11 are concerned wi th Soviet religious poli cy per se . 
Hypothesis 1 :  Nationally .!inked religions �!_ larger nationalities are 
more threatening than thos� of smaller nationalities . 
Whi le addi tiona! factors have to be added into the calculation in' 
order to capture the comp lexity of the s i tuation accurately , it appears 
that, wh ere  the rel igion/nationalism symbiosis i s  concerned , the Soviets 
have been  most troubled by Ukrainian Catholicism and Cen tral Asian 
Is lam.  N either the nationally intense catholicism of the Lithuanians nor 
the Islam of the ·sma l ler peoples of the USSR produces fulminations as 
feveri sh as those inspired by Ukrainian Uniates and underground Is lam in 
1 . 1 4 f h 1 h . h f h Centra As�a. In the case o t e atter , t e Sov1ets ave o ten soug t 
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to blame heightened Islamic consciousness on the influence and 
activities of forei gn groups--as in the case of an article by A. Ortigov 
in the February 1 5 , 1 983 i s sue of Soviet Uzbekistan and in the case of 
an arti cle by A.  Doev in the F ebruary 1984 i s sue of the Kirghiz edi tion 
of Kommunist .
15 
Moreover , whi l e  the Soviets banned the Ukrainian 
Uniate s ,  the Lithuanian catholic Church has been allowed to continue 
lega l operation. 
Hypothesis 2 :  In the case of nationalities with more than one ' national 
religion , '  th� regime will tend to view � ' national religion ' as � 
dangerous than the other . 
At least four nations in the communist world have more than one 
'national religion, ' i . e . more than one religious organization c laims to 
be the protector and t r aditional cultural organization of the group: 
Hungary ( catholici sm and Calvinism ) , Romania (Orthodoxy and Greek-Rite 
Ca tholicism) , Ukraine (Greek-Rite [ Uniate ] Ca tho1 ici sm and Orthodoxy ) ,  
and the Ossetians (Orthodoxy and Islam ) . In two of these cases ,  one of 
th e compe t.ing religions has been banned outright (Greek-Rite catholicism 
in Romania a nd Ukraine) . I n  Hungary , the Calvinist Church accommodated 
it sel f to communi sm much sooner , just as Orthodoxy did where the 
Ossetians are concern ed .  The religious group seen as "more threatening" 
is so ide ntified ,  in each case , on the basis of its greater resistance 
to cooptation and , in the Ukrainian case , also on the bas is of its 
li nkage with centri fuga l ide ology . In Ukraine , the Ukrainian Orthodox 
have also been blunted , by being united organizationally into the 
Rus sian Orthodox Church . 
Hypothesis 3 :  Nationalists tend to identify � single religion with their 
particular nationality grou_E and are therefore antagonistic toward 
proselytization E� splinter sects ; the splinter sects are often 
antagonistic or indifferent toward national feeling . 
Among L ithuanian nationa lists,  for instance , the editors of Ausrele 
insist that all Lithuanians should be catholic and argue that "the 
[ Lithua nian ] nation wil l  remain alive only as long as the catholic 
Chur ch . . 
.. 16 
remaJ.ns alJ. ve. Whatever erodes the strength of the catholic 
Church in Lithuania--whether atheization or proselytization by other 
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groups--i s ipso fact� inimical to the nation as a collective entity .  The 
identification of nationality with rel igion is so strong among the 
Mus l ims of Central As ia as to render the concept of religionle ss 
na tionality ananalous and incanprehensible ,  17 and Christian churches are 
rightly v i ewed as indifferent toward the national feel ing of Central 
Asians. Among Ukrainians , P rotestant sects such as Jehovah ' s  Witnesses 
.have no interest in Ukrainian nationalism and therefor e oft en function 
d f f . f . . 18 d f . . 1 
. h as e acto agents o Rus sJ.  J. catJ.on . An or Rus ::aan na tJ. ona J. sts,  t e 
Russian Orthodox Chu1 ch has o ften been viewed as the most authentically 
Rus sian insti tut ion .  I nde ed , 
in a multi-n ational setting even non-bel i eving 
Russians will often call themselves Orthodox to 
clearl y mark off their national identity from that of 
Soviet citizens of non-Russian origin.  This  same close 
J:-J() nd between Orthodox rel igion and Rus sian nat.i onali ty 
was also forged by the short-lived , political ly 
oppositional Berdya ev Circle whi ch wanted to carry 
this connection to the extreme by founding a new 
politi cal orde r on the Chur ch . Bapti sm i n  the Orthodox 
Church . . . is  regarded by many as a nati onal cus tom. 
Rather than symboli sing a strictly reJ igious commi t­
ment , baptism is often appr��ched as an act of 
af f irming a nationaJ tradi tion . 
Corollary 3a : Assaults on the primary religious organization �!. ��­
Russian peoples � to E� viewed � attempts to de-nationalize them as 
a preparation for eventual Russification . 
Thi s fol lows directly from the foregoing evidence and indicat es 
th at not only the regime but the people as wel l appreciate the extent to 
whi ch atheism is designed to serve considerations of nationalities 
policy and , even mo re ,  fear the impl ications of atheism for .the 
preservation of their national identiti e s .  Assaults on the Russian 
O rthodox Church are vi ewed , simi larly , by Rus sian Slavophi les,  as 
attempts to denationa lize the Russian people and cut them off from their 
. . 20 non-SovJ.et past . 
Hypothesis 4 :  Interregional migratory dispersion weakens ethnic con-
. . sciousness and attenuates the reinforcement which religion provides to 
nationality . 
To take one example of thi s ,  Ukrainians and Belorussians who are 
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moved to Central Asian cities find Russian-language schools ,  film s ,  and 
pe ri odicals readily available , but find li ttle in their own languages .  
The Ukrainian a nd B elorussian Orthodox Church organizations have bo th  
be en suppr essed ,  and hence Orthodox Slavs i n  Central Asia have only the 
Rus sian Orthodox Church available . 21 Moreover ,  Ukrainians and Bela­
russians a re viewed by the Central Asians as simply "Russia ns , "  much in 
th e way that Aus tri ans are often viewed by Slavs as "Germans. " 
Simila rly , a transplanted Li thuanian , cut off from his/her homeland , is 
under gr eat pressure to assimi l.at.e , and likewise may find that the 
ava i la ble ca tholic churches are not Lithuanian in culture. The 
tr anspl antation of the Crimean Tatars seems to have had the opposite 
ef fec t ,  u ndoubtedly because :r·ather than being di spersed they were moved 
as an entire communi ty and have continued to exist as a compact. 
communi ty .  I nterregional migration is most effective in dissolving 
ethnic consci ousness wh en the community itsel f is termi nated through 
dispersion. 
Hypothesis 6 :  Tactical. changes in religious policy and in nationalities 
policy tend to coincide , since they are parts of a seamless web of 
interrel ated polid es.  
Th e  ' NEP ' period wa s a pe ri od  of rel axat ion in both the ethnic 
sfhere a nd the religious sphere. This was reversed between 1 928 and 1 9 29 
with the passage of a new l aw on religion, the di spatch of new cadres to 
administer the non-Russian a reas ,  a re-Russi fication of Ukraine and 
Bel orus sia,  and new pr essure on religious organizati ons . The wartime 
rehabilitation of Russian nationalism coincided with a partial rehabili­
ta tion of the Rus sian Orthodo x  Church , just as Khrushchev ' s  subsequent 
ant i-religious drive of 1959-1964 coincided wi th the launching of a 
campaign to intensify linguistic Rus sification , with the 2 2nd CPSU 
Congress in 1 961 officially proclaiming a drive to merge the nations of 
th e US SR . Under Brezhnev, resolutions taken by the CPSU Central 
Committee in 1979  spec i fi cally signa l led a toughening in both athei st 
25  an d  international i st propaganda , and the drive to assail Musl im 
practices coinc ided wi th renewed pa rty concern about shifting demo­
graphi cs in Central Asia . 
It is not to be supposed ,  o f  course , that every change of policy in 
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one of these spheres necessa rily entai ls change in the othe r .  But sin ce 
the two policy realms ar e united by broad overlapping obj ectives 
( Sovie tization , secul a rization, social homogeni zation )  and by certain 
common instruments ( ideology , intermarriage , urbanizat ion , Rus sifica­
tion) , it is natural that change in one sphere of policy shou ld suggest 
change also in Ute othe r ,  or--to put it another way --change in either 
sfhere is apt to ref lect change in the approach to certain obj ectives 
and instruments common to both policy spheres . 
Corollary 6a : Anti-religious campaigns can be expected to coincide with 
increased vigilance against divisive nationalism , and vice vers�. 
Corollary 6b : Foreign _EOlicy pressures and perturbations which excite 
clampdowns or relaxations �� either th� religious � the national ities 
sphere are �pt to �xcite complementary activity in the other sphere as 
well . 
Ev idence for both corollaries may be found in the Czechoslovak 
crisis of 1968 and the Pol i sh euphoria of 1 980-1 981 . The l ibe ralizati on 
of Czechoslovak politics in 1968  exci ted a wave of expression of 
nationalist discontent. in the Ukraine and also s timulated the revival of 
open activity on the part of the banned Uniate Church . In response , the 
regime o rganiz ed a number of elaborate anti-religious seminars in 1968 
and 196 9 ,  especially in the Transcarpathian oblast.  In the wake of 
Polish dis turbances 1 980-1 981 ,  there were anti-Russian demonstrations in 
several Bal tic cities and Latvian Party Secretary A. E .  Voss openly 
fret t ed ,  in January 1 981 , over the spread of "bourgeois national ism" in 
the Soviet West. Once again, anti-Russ ian nationalism was l inked with 
the churches,  and once again ,  anti-religious seminars and meet ings were 
. ed . . 26 organ1z 1n the Sov1et West. 
Hypothesis 7 :  Regional variations in nationalities policy have impact on 
regional expressions of religious polici · 
The targeting of Ukrainians and Bel orus sians for fa ster rates of 
as simi lation27 is reflected in the disappearance of their autonomous 
religious organizations .  The greater resistance of Lithuania to 
Rus sification- -both demogr aphi cally and linguistically--when compared 
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with the other Ba ltic republics has its paral l el in the greater strength 
of the catholic Church in Lithuania.  The Georgians have in many spheres 
been c omparatively better a ble than most other Soviet nationalities to 
re sist Rus sian encroachment ;  the nationalist currents present in the 
Georgi a n  Orthodox Church are the result of grass roots pressure . 
Laxity in one sphere may also be accompanied by laxity in the 
oth e r .  I n  Central Asi a ,  f o r  example , the quiet reassertion of 
' na tionalist '  attitudes is  paralleled in a pronouncedly lax attitude 
toward religion--lax , at least ,  by Soviet standards . Complaints continue 
to surfa ce,  theref ore , of " pe rmi s sive"  a ttitu des on the part of local 
offi cia ls toward religion a nd a certain raikom secretary was specifi-
28 
ca lly upbraided for having urged that "religion doe s  not do any harm . " 
C omparing Lithuania a nd Kazakhstan , one might note that the more 
aggr essive posture of Soviet cultural policy in the latter is al so 
r epl ica t ed  in the religious sphere , for although both republics gi ve 
promi nent play to atheist ideas in the schools, atheist. ag itators are 
. . h . . f 
29 
ac t1ve out s1de the sc ools only 1n the latter , not 1n the ormer . 
Hypothesis 8 :  There is  a difference in regime orientation toward nation-
alists who are believers and toward those who are not .  
Athei st nat ionali sts are , in a sense , mo re primevally threatening 
bec ause they cha llenge the concept of the seamless web and discriminate 
be tween those parts of the package whi ch they accept and those which 
they do n o t .  From the Soviet viewpoint,  the erosion of religion is 
supposed to promote the erosion of "bourgeois nationali sm . "  To the 
extent that it does not, "bourgeois  nationalism" will have shown itself 
to have additional { or pe rhaps, alternative) ideological resources.  
Hypothesis 9 :  The creation or suppression of ethnic identities is 
impeded El ethnically linked religious affilia tion , and hence the 
manipulation of ethnic identity requires the cooptation or manipulation 
of th� religious elite� . 
Th e poli cy of dividing larger groups into a number of smaller  
groups , known as  razmezhevanie ,  30 divided Chech en from Ingush , North 
Ossetian from South Osseti a n ,  Moldavian from Romanian , and spl intered 
th e Mus lim nation of Turke stan into a ho st of smaller  groups , i ncluding 
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Kaz akh s ,  K irghi z , and Karakalpaks .  In all the se cases , new identities 
were manufa ctured and presented as the "authentic "  expression of 
sel f-determination . In Oentral Asi a ,  this  policy targeted the tradition­
al Mus lim identity . Two recent Soviet authors conceded as  much , when 
they noted that Isl am continues to unite believe rs and nonbel ievers 
withi n  on e nation and to create a feel ing of community between 
practicing Mus l ims and those who had professed Islam ( or who se forebears 
had done so) in the past. But , they quickly added , rel igious-based 
consciousness has nothing in common with thc1 community among Soviet 
3 1  people s as a whol e .  All the same , Central Asians oft en observe Islamic 
rel igious .r.·ites as  assertions of their ethnicity--which tends to 
undermi ne the new republ ic-based national identities they have been 
a s s i gned by the CPSU a nd to set them apa rt from the rest of the 
population. Through manipulation of the coopted �lema ( "offi cial Isl am" ) 
the Soviets have endeavored to e rode t raditional Islamic cus toms either 
by attribut ing them to paga n derivation or by simply ignori ng them as 
"backwa rd , "  and to replace them with new " international , "  " Soviet" 
cu stan s .  Underground cleri cs ( "unofficial Islam" ) are th reatening in 
pa rt because they continue to use the traditional customs and rites and 
d f h f f  . . . f . 1 
32 
e y t e e orts at Sov�et�zat � on o r� tua s .  
Hypothesis 10 : As certain �roups assimilate E� " socialist" traditions 
and ceremonies and lose acquaintance with their traditional ceremonies 
and customs , they become �ess threatening !� � regime , or , to put it 
another way , secul a rization converts "bourgeois nationali sm" in to 
" social ist patriotism, " by weakening tokens of particularity . 
I n  Armeni a ,  as in other parts ,  the performan ce of hallowed reli­
gious tradi tions,  including in thi s case pilgrimages to the ca htedral of 
Etchmiadz in,  the sanctuary of Tcharchaban at Armash , and other historic 
rel igious sites , has the ch aracter not merely of pious observance .but 
al so of ethnic loyalty . Thi s ' extra-religious ' dimensi on to ritual is 
pe rhaps as troubl ing to the authorities as the ethical-doctrinal 
dimension. 33 '' Internationalization " finds in rel igion a clear obstacle , 
a nd  thus secul a rizaU on serves the interests of both religious pol icy 
and nat.ionali ties poli cy . 
Sovi et writer I .M .  Dzha bbarov explici tly linked seculari zation and 
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in ternationalization : 
A further developnent of the Soviet way of life and 
the reorganization of the everyday l i fe of the Soviet 
pe ople on a communist basis serves as an active factor 
in promoting an intensification of the secula riza tion 
of the entire mode of life and of family and domestic 
r elation s .  Even such stable elements of everyday l ife 
as housing , clothing , food , fami ly and marriage 
r elations and rites and ri tual s ,  when they become 
subj ected to the influence of the process of inter­
nationalizat.ion and of the Soviet way of l if e ,  
gradually become free o f  rel igious survivals .  A s  a 
result of the internationalization of social life and 
of culture and everyday life there occurs a substan­
tial weakening of the connections and then a complete 
break ��tween the rel igious and the national 
moments.  
Th e resu lt_ is the reinforcement of  tendencies towa rd Sovietization in 
the sense of the di lution of speci f ic ethn ic  culture . 
At the pr esent time , thanks to the f inal formation of 
an Uzbek socialist nation , with the Uzbeks , as with 
other nations ,  local characteri stics in the materi al  
forms of  everyday l ife have not only greatly disap­
peared or been leveled out , but have been replaced 
predominantly by national [ sic ] elements . This is 
witnessed by the appearance in the vocabulary of the 
Uzbek l anguage of many new everyday terms which have 
been borrowed from the Rus sian jlfld from other 
languages of the peoples of the US SR . 
Simi larl y ,  the creation of new socialist ri tua l s  goe s  hand in hand with 
the suppression of traditional Islamic customs in providing Soviet 
ci tizen s  with a new s ense of "national "  i dentity . 36 
Hypothesis  1 1 : By targeting traditional religio-national E� for 
expurgation and suppression , Soviet nationalities policy converts 
athei sm �nto � weapon of denationalization and tightens the connection 
between religious consciousness and national consciousness . 
Soviet hi storiography celebrates Czarism ' s  expansion of the 
empire ' s  frontiers and thus is at odds with the folk hi story of the 
borderlands , many of whose political heroes acquired that renown through 
their resi stance to Rus sia.  37 Where rel igious leaders are involved , as  
is  the case  e specially in Central Asi a ,  but also in Lithuania and 
el sewh er e ,  the suppression reinforces awareness of the national role of 
religious figures . In t he North Caucasus , for instance ,  Sheik Shamil , a 
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Muridic imam , led g uerril la forces in a 25-year war of resistance 
against the Rus sian army , 183 4-185 9.  A maj or revolt in the Andizhan 
Va l ley in Ka zakhstan in 1 898 , against Russian rul e ,  was led by Dukchi 
Ishan , Y.ho sought t.o create a reg ime organized on Sufi principles.  The re 
were also religious overtone s--embodied in the catalyt ic role of the 
ulema--to the widespread Central Asian revolt of 1916 , and to 
anti-Russian resistance throughout that area in the 1800 s .  In Ukrain e ,  
th e Russian a rmy was sent against the insurgents i n  the anti-Pol i sh 
Kol ii rebel lion in 1 768 ; the leader of the rebels was Maxim Za lizn iak , a 
product of Ukra inian monastic life .  In  Armenia , nationalist sel f-defense 
groups began to organize themselves in Erzerum in the 1880 s ,  with the 
knowledge and tacit approval of Khrimi an,  the Armenian Patriarch of 
Constantinople , and religious models from medieval Armenian Christianity 
and al so from ![.;lam later provided inspiration for the Armenian Dashnak 
guerrillas .  And though nineteenth-century Lithuanian Bi shop Motie j us 
Valencius did not bel ieve an independent Lithuania was politically 
poss ible ,  he i s  c redited with having done more than any other individual 
. . . 1 . . h 38 to nurture L1thua n1an nat1ona consc1ousness 1n t at century . 
Soviet pol i cy tended to be counterproductive in the short run , by 
in flami ng anti-Rus sian and anti-regime sentiments ;  whether the combina­
tion o f  demographic mixing , secularization , and Sovietization can effect 
th e  degr ee of social homogenizat ion generally that has a l r eady been 
achieved to a l a rge degree in B elorussia and eas tern Ukraine is t he 
chal lenge upon whi ch the su ccess or fa ilure of Soviet policy in the long 
run will be mea sured .  
Conclusion . I f  there is  a thematic current underlying these distinct 
hypothese s ,  it is that the Soviets do not view ei ther religious policy 
or nati onalities policy in isolation , but view both as dimensions of a 
broader program of communization ( "the building of communism" ) .  Soviet · 
so ciology of religion is  viewed instrumentally , as a means to develop 
th ff . 1 "  f h . . 39 kh t . e mo st e ect1ve po 1cy o at e1zat10n. As I . D .  Pants a va pu J.t , 
in a 1 9 69 es say ,  "religious pre judices can be overcome only if we know 
the concr·ete forms in whi ch rel igion exists today , the [ present ] state 
f ] . . . d h nd . d h . . "
40 o re . 1g1ous consc1ousness,  an t e te encJ.es towar c ange 1n J.t . 
Similia rly , Soviet "ethnosociologists"  are entrusted with promoting the 
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rapproch ement of nations and the evolut ion of the New Soviet Man . 41 The 
Soviet regime sees itsel f  as fa shioning a new "Soviet culture ,  "42 whi ch 
i s  athe is t , bilingual ( wi th Russian as the lingua franc�) , and 
ethnically convergent, giving ri se to a new hi storical category , the 
" Soviet people . "  
Inter-ethnic problems af f l i ct countries of all political and 
religious pe r suasions--a s the examples of Quebecoise separatism in 
Ca nada , Si kh violence in Indi a ,  South Tyrolean discontent in Italy , 
A lbanian irredenti sm in Yugoslavia ,  and north-south problems in Chad and 
Sudan make clear.  But whi le the Soviet system cannot. be sa id to have· 
created its difficulties in this realm , nor has it made much headway 
towa rd solving them , wh ether in th e sense in which the Sovi ets 
themselves speak of sol utions or in the sense in which West erners might 
do so .  Moreove1: , the combined effect of Len inist hostility to both 
national  divers ity and religio-nationalist symbiotic bonds and to 
en courage both bel ieve1: s and non-bel i evers to view assaults on their 
traditional religions as  assaults on their respective national heri­
�age s .  
FOOTNOTES 
1 Pravda (March 30 , 1 97 9) ; and Pravda ( OCtober 21 , 1 981 ) . A Soviet 
h a ndbook for athei sm def ines religion as "bel ief in a nonexistent,  
supernatural world , supposedly inhabi t ed  by gods , spiri t s ,  angel s ,  
sain t s ,  the souls of the dead or other supernatural beings . "--Sputnik 
ateista , 2nd · ed . (Mos cow , 1 96 1 ) , p .  1 3 ,  as quoted in David E .  Powell ,  
Antireligious Propaganda i n  the Soviet Union ( Cambridge , Mass . :  MIT 
Pre ss ,  1 97 5 ) , pp . 9-1 0 .  
2 I have el aborated on thi s in " The  Interplay of Religious Pol i cy  
a nd  Nationalities Pol i cy i n  the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe , "  in 
Pedro Ramet ( ed . ) , Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Eas t  European 
Politics ( forthcoming from Duke University Press ) . 
3 Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia , i n  a Jun e  1 0 ,  1 976, statement , 
quot ed  i n  Otto Ulc , •i social  Deviance in Czechoslovakia , "  in Ivan Volgyes 
( ed . )  , Social Deviance in Eastern Europe (Boulder , Colo . : Westview 
Pres s ,  1 9 78 ) , p .  28 . 
4 Slovo lektora , no . 5 (May 1982 ) , p .  3 9 .  
- 3 1  -
5 
Pravda (March 30 , 1 979) . On the other hand , see the accounts in 
Gerhard Simon , "Die Lage der Kirchen in der Sowj etunion und das neue 
Rel igionsgesetz , "  in Kirche in Not , Vol . 24 ( 1976 ) , pp . 92-9 3 ;  and 
"Sko l' ko veruyushchih v SS SR , "  in Pose� , No . 11 (November 1 981 ) , pp . 
7- 8 .  
6
zachary T .  Irwin,  "Legitimacy and Rel igion ' s  Revival : Steps in a 
Systemic Conve rgence , "  paper presented at the 2 1 st Conference of the 
Wes tern Sl avi c Association, Standard University , March 29-3 1 , 1 984 . 
7
Komsomolskaya pravda (March 1 5 , 1 98 2 ) , translated into Croatian in 
Aktualnosti Krscanske Sadasnjosti Informativni bilten (AKSA ) 1 March 26 , 
198 2 . 
8 See Gerhard Simon , "Das neue sowjetische Religionsgesetz , "  in 
Osteuropa , Vol . 2 7 ,  No . 1 ( January 1 97 7 ) , pp . 4-8 ; and Otto Luchter­
handt , "Geknebelt ,  und dennoch lebensfahig : Die Russisch-Orthodoxe 
Kirche in der �ra Breschn ew , "  in Herder Korrespondenz 1 Vol . 36 , No . 5 
(May 198 2 )  , pp. 2 3 3-2 3 4 .  
9Malik Sabirovi ch Fazyl ov, Religiya i natsional ' nyye otnosheniya 
(Alma At a:  Kaz akhstan Publ ishing House , 1 96 9 ) . 
1 0rn a 1 966 article for Voprosy istorii , two Soviet writers offered 
the fol l owing definition ( a  variation on Stalin ' s  definition of 1 9 13 ) : 
"The nation is a hi stori cally arisen community of people , whi ch is 
cha racte rized by a stable , shared economic l ife ( with the exi stence of a 
work ing c lass) , a common territory , common language (especially a common 
literary l anguage) , a consciousness of ethnic identity as well as 
pa rticul arities of psyche and of traditions of life style , of culture as 
wel l a s  a [ common ) liberation struggle . " --D .M.  Rogachev and M . A. 
Sverdlin1  " 0  ponj at ii ' n acij a '  " ,  in Voprosy istorii , No . 1 ( 1966) , as 
quo t ed  in Boris Meissne r ,  "National it1=itenfrage und Sowj etideologie , "  in 
Europai sche Rundschau , Vol . 7 ,  No . 4 ( Fal l 197 9) , p .  81 . 
11 
Borys Lewytzkyj , " '  Sovetskij Narod ' --was heisst eigentli ch 
' Sowjetvolk ' ?" ,  in Osterreichische Ostheft e ,  Vol . 1 5 , No . 2 (May 1 9 73 ) , 
pp . 1 06 , 1 10 ;  and Gerhard Simon ,  " Sowjet ische NationaliU:itenpolitik , " in 
Politische Studien , Vol . 25 , No. 214 (March-April 1974) , pp . 168 -1 6 9 .  
12 "La persecuzione rel igiosa in Ucraina (A  cura della  Commi s sione 
per i d iritti dell ' uorro del congresso mondiale dei liberi ucraini , " in 
Russia Cristiana , Vol . 3 ,  No.  2 (March-April 1978 ) 1 pp . 40-4 1 .  
13
valentyn Mor oz ,  Khronika oporu , quoted in Vasyl Markus , "Rel igion 
and Nati onal ity : the Uniates of the Ukraine 1 " in Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and 
John W .  Strong ( eds . ) , Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Easte rn 
Europe (London : Macmillan Pres s ,  1975 ) , p .  118 . 
- 3 2 -
14  
For examples of Soviet attacks on  the Ukrainian Uniates , see : 
Kultura i Zhyttya ( January 3 ,  1969) , Lyudina i Svit (Kiev, October 
1 97 0) , Lyudina i Svit ( August 197 1 ) , Robytnycha Hazeta (Kiev, March 15 , 
1 9 73 ) --translated , respectively , i n  Religion in Communist Dominated 
Areas , May -June 196 9  ( pp .  1 03 -1 05 ) , April 1971 ( pp .  68-69) , Apri l-June 
19 7 2  ( p .  80 ) , a nd July- September 1973 ( pp .  1 29-1 30 ) ; Radyanska Ukrayina 
{ March 2 4-26 , 1 98 1 ) , Radyanska Ukrayina (June 28 , 198 1 ) , and Sil ' s ' ki 
visti (November 11 , 1 982) --translated ,  respectively , in Joint Publica­
ti ons Research Service ( JPRS ) , USSR Report , August 19 , 1 981 , September 
2 5 , 1 98 1 ,  a nd February 1 7 ,  1 983 . Regarding Soviet posture vis-a-vis 
unofficial Islam ,  see Baymirza Hayi t ,  "Der Is lam und die Anti-Islami s che  
B ewegung in der Sowj etunion , " i n  Osteuropa , Vol . 22 , No . 2 ( February 
1 97 2)  , p .  1 16 ; John Soper , "Unofficial Is lam: a Muslim Minori ty in the 
US SR , "  i n  Religion in Communist Lands , Vol . 7 ,  No . 4 (Win t er 1979 ) , pp . 
226-2 31 ;  Allen Hetmanek , " Spi llover Effects of Rel igious Broadca sts in 
Iran on Sovi et Mus lims , "  Radio Liberty Research (April 1 4 ,  1 980 ) , p. 3 ;  
Trud ( Ju ly 1 9 ,  1 98 3 ) , translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Pres s ,  
Vol . 3 5 ,  N o .  3 4  ( S eptember 2 1 ,  1 98 3 ) , pp . 1 0-ll ; and Timur Kocaoglu , 
"Recent Reports on Acti vities of Living Mus lim 1 Saints 1 in USSR , "  Radio 
Liberty Research ( S eptember 1 5 , 1 98 3 ) , pp . 1-2 , 4 .  
15Arabia (London ,  Ju ly 1984) , p .  3 7 . 
16Ausrele ( February 1978 ) , quoted in Kestutis K .  Girnius , "Nation­
alism a nd the Cathol ic Church in Lithuania , "  in Ramet ( ed . ) ,  Religion 
and Nationalism .  
1 7  See James Critchlow , " Is lam and Nationalism in Soviet Central 
Asia , "  i n  Ramet ( ed . ) , Religion and Nationalism . 
18 Bohdan R.  Bociurkiw , "Rel igion and Nationality in the Contem-
porary Ukraine , "  in George W .  Simmonds ( ed . )  , Nationalism in the USSR 
and Eastern Europe (Detroit : University of Detroit Press , 197 7 ) , pp . 
8 7- 89. 
1 9eri stel Lan e ,  Christian Religion in the Soviet Union (London : 
Geo rge Al len a nd Unwin , 1 9 7 8 ) , p .  7 7. 
20 See V .  Gorskii , "Russian Messianism and the New National Con-
sciousnes s "  ( o riginally i n  Metanoiia ) ,  in Michael Meerson-Aksenov and 
Bor i s  Shragin ( eds . ) , The Political , Social and Religious Thought of 
Russian Samizdat--an Anthology (Belmont , Mas s . :  Nordland Publi shing Co . ,  
1 97 7 ) , pp. 3 5 6 ,  367- 36 8 .  
21 In theory the situation is no different in Ukraine and 
Bel o russia, but in practice , many so-cal led Russian Orthodox churches in 
th e we stern Ukraine h ave sermons in Ukrainian , and pre serve certain 
Un iate traditions . 
- 3 3  -
22see Cynthia H .  Enl oe ,  "Rel igion and Ethnici ty , "  in Pete:r F .  Sugar 
( ed . ) , Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe ( Santa Barbara , 
ca lif . :  ABC-Clio, 1 980) , pp. 3 5 9- 366 . 
23 'l'he  Pokutnyky a re a breakaway sect from the catholic Church in 
Ukraine ,  dat ing from 1 9 5 4 .  See Bociurkiw, "Religion a nd Na tional ity , "  
pp . 86-87 . 
24 Bohdan R .  Bociurkiw , "The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox 
Chur ch , 19 2 0-1 9 3 0 :  A cas e  S tudy in Religious Moderniza tion , "  in Denn is 
J .  Du nn ( ed . ) , Rel igion and Modernization in the Soviet Union (Boulder , 
Colo. : Westview Pres s ,  197 7 ) , pp . 3 38-339 .  
25
Yaa cov Ro' i 1  " The Task of Creating the New Soviet Man : ' Atheistic 
Propaganda ' in the Soviet Mus l im Areas , "  in Soviet Studies 1 Vol . 36 , No. 
1 (Janua :ry 1984 ) , p .  3 5 .  
26 See Gray Hodnett and Pete:r J .  Pot ichnyj , The Ukraine and the 
czechoslovak Crisis ( Canberra : Australian National University Occasional 
Paper No. 6 1  1 97 0) ; Pedro Ramet , " Domestic Determinants of Soviet 
Interventi on Pol i cy : the Repercussions of the Czech a nd Pol i sh Crises in 
th e Soviet West, " in Osteuropa ( forthcoming ) ;  and V .  Mahin ,  "Religiya v 
ideinom arsenale antikomirnlnizma , "  in Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie ,  No. 
1 2  ( December 1982)  , pp . 1 1 5-1 22 .  
27  
For arguments to  thi s effect,  see  Pedro Ramet , "Lingui stic 
As s imilation in Ukraine , "  in Ukrainian Quarterly , Vol . 35 , No . 3 (Autumn 
1 97 9) ; also Stephan M.  Horak ,  "Bel orussia :  Modernization, Human Rights,  
National ism , "  in Ihor Kamenetsky ( ed . ) ,  Nationalism and Human Rights in 
the USSR (Littleton , Colo. : Librari es Unlimi ted , 1 97 7 ) . 
28Quoted in T . S .  Saidbaev, Islam i obshchestvo ; opyt istoriko­
sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia (Moscow :  Nauka , 1 978 ) , as given in 
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone , "Rel igion and Nationalj sm in Soviet Central 
Asia , "  in Raymond G .  Gastil ( ed . ) ,  Freedom in the World : Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties (Westport , Conn . : G reenwood , 1 981 ) , p. 205 .  
29 II d • ' ' 1  • • • 1 d • 1 An reJ  M1cha] ov1 c :  I g1ovan1 , a propagan a ate1 sta e a 
religios ita , " i n  Russia Christiana , Vol . 7 ,  No . 5 ( September-October 
1 982 )  1 P • 76 • 
30 
Re. razmezhevanie , see Teresa Rakowska�Harmstone , Russia ·and 
Nationalism in Central Asia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press ,  1 9 7 0 ) , pp. 
26 -2 7 .  
31 F .K .  Kod iarl i and R . O .  Kurbanov, 
kons epts ii musal ' manskogo natsional ' nogo 
filosofii ( 1 98 2 )  , No . 1 2 ,  p. 1 1 1 . 
- 3 4  -
"O reaktsionnoi sushnosti 
kommunizma , " .  in Voprosy 
32s .  Dorzhenov, " Shto eto--musul ' ma n? " , in Nauka i religiya ( 1967 ) , 
N o .  4 ,  excerpted in Religion in Communist Lands , Vol . 2 ,  Nos . 4-5 
( Ju ly-Oc tober 1 97 4) , pp . 44-4 5 ; N .  Ashirov, " Islam i natsional ' nye 
otnoshen iya , "  in Nauka i religiya ( 1974 ) , No.  2 ,  translated into German 
unde r  the title , " Is l ami sche Probleme in Sowj etasien , "  in Osteuropa , 
Vol . 2 5 , No . 4 (April 197 5 ) , p .  A206 ; " Official Attitudes toward Islamic 
CUs tan s , " Radio Liberty Research (March 2 2 ,  197 7)  , pp. 3 ,  5 ;  
Turkmenskaya iskra (May 30 , 1 9 76 ) , translated in CDSP , Vol . 28 , No . 23 
(Ju l y  7 ,  1 976 ) , p. 1 ;  and Soper , "Unofficial Islam , " esp. pp . 226-2 2 7 .  
A lexandre Bennigsen call s  the underground Sufi brotherhoods "the most 
in tractable and dangerous adversari es of the Soviet reg ime , "  describi ng 
them as  "the only authentic anti-Soviet mass organizations in the 
US SR . " - -A le xandre Bennigs en, "Mus lim Conservative Opposition to the 
Sovie t  R eg ime : the Sufi Brotherhoods in the North Caucasus , "  in Jeremy 
R .  Az rael ( ed . ) , Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices (New York : 
Praeger P ublishers ,  1 978 ) , p .  344 .  
3 3 hak d ' I I  ' 1 '  Va n N .  Da rl.an, NatJ.ona J sm 
of Ethnocentrism , "  in Simmonds ( ed . ) , 
Eastern Europe , pp . 222 ,  2 39-2 4 0. 
in Soviet Armenia--A Cas e  Study 
Nationalism in the USSR and 
34 Problemy nauchnogo atiezma ( 1973 ) , No . 1 4 ,  p .  25 . 
35 rbid . 
36 See B . S .  Tukhliyev,  "The Sign i ficance of New Ritual s  and Tradi-
tions in the Development of the Rural Workers ' Life Style , "  in 
Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane ( Tashkent, 1979) , No . 1 1 ,  trans­
lated in JPRS , USSR Report (April 25 , 1 980 ) ; Sovetskaya kirgiziya 
( Frunze, September 1 2 ,  1 98 0 ) ; and Helene Ca rrere D ' Encauss e ,  "Islam in 
the Sovi et Union : Attempts at Modernization , "  in Religion in Communist 
Lands , Vol . 2, Nos . 4-5 (Ju ly-October 197 4) . 
37 
E .g .  a Central Asian dai ly wrote , i n  September 1982 : "Despite the 
COI!'!Ple te (l y ]  reactionary nature of czari sm ' s  colonization pol icy , uni on 
with Rus sia played a progressive role under the hi storical conditions 
whi ch h ad taken shape whe re the danger of complete enslavement and 
sys t ematic destruction and plundering by the feudal despot s ,  who 
surrounded Turkmenia and behind whose backs stood imperialist England , 
threatened the Turkmen people . " --Turkmenskaya i skra ( September 1 ,  1 98 2 ) , 
translated in JPRS , USSR Report ( October 2 7 ,  1 98 2 ) . 
38Lowel l Til lett,  The Great Friendship : Soviet Historians on the 
Non-Russian Nationalities ( Chapel Hi ll : Univers ity of North Carolina 
P re s s ,  1 96 9) , pp . 1 30- 1 33 , 1 72-1 77 , 2 3 2-2 3 3 ,  240-24 5 ;  Micvhael 
H rushevsky , A History of Ukraine (N ew Haven , Conn . : Yale University 
Pre ss ,  1 941 ) , pp . 443-4 4 5 ;  Manuel Sarkisyanz , A Modern History of 
Transcaucasian Armenia (N agpur , · I ndia : Udyama Commercial Press ,  1 9 75 ) , 
pp . 1 1 7 ,  1 35 ;  and V .  Stanley Vardys , The Catholic Church , Dissent and 
Nationality in Soviet Lituania (New York : East European Monographs , 
Columbia University Press ,  1 9 78 ) , p .  9 .  
- 3 5  -
39
Jer ry G .  Pankhurs t ,  " Soviet Sociology of Rel igion, "  i n  Religion 
in Communist Land s ,  Vol . 1 0 ,  N o .  3 (Winter 1 982) , pp . 2 92-293 . 
40
Quoted in Powel l ,  Antireligious Propaganda , p .  1 7 .  
41 "The Social and the National : A Study in Ethnosociology , "  in 
Soviet Life (Moscow ) , No .  1 2  (December 1 9 76 ) , pp . 32-35 ; and Sergei 
Voronitsyn , "Controversy about Demographi c Policy in the USSR , "  Radio 
Liberty Research ( S eptember 2 2 ,  1 978 ) , pp . 2-3 . 
42
P .  Fedoseev , "Teoreticheskie problE-my razvi tiya i sblizheniya 
nats i i , " in Kommunist , No . 11 73  (January 1 980 ) , p .  66 . 
- 3 6  -
